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Abstract 
 
Spamming remains a form of Internet abuse, which 
burdens the Internet infrastructure, is generally 
regarded as an annoyance, and is said to cause  
economic harm to the tune of about several billion 
US$ per year. Many technological, organizational, 
and legislative anti-spam measures have  already been 
proposed and implemented, but have not led to any 
substantial decrease in the number of spam e-mails. 
We  propose  here a new infrastructure framework that 
combines several anti-spam measures in a framework 
that features both a technological and an 
organizational facet. The key element of our 
infrastructure is a new organizational unit that 
reliably and transparently limits the number of e-mails 
that can be sent per day and per account. This paper 
first gives an overview of the framework, then it 
provides technological and organizational details of 
the infrastructure, the deployment of which depends to 
a large degree on its acceptance and propagation by 
the ICANN, the ISOC, and by large e-mail service 
providers. Finally, the paper discusses the limitations 
and drawbacks of the proposed framework. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We still face in practice a high volume and a high 
portion of spam e-mails, although many technological, 
organizational, and legislative anti-spam measures 
have already been proposed and implemented. This 
makes it necessary to continue with research regarding 
both the development and deployment of effective 
anti-spam countermeasures. This far, no single 
measure has proved to be the silver bullet against 
spam, and it is doubtful whether any single, simple 
solution will ever be able to reduce or stop spam. 
Rather it seems appropriate to look for solutions that 
provide a complementary application of several anti-
spam measures. This paper aims at the conceptual 
development and analysis of an infrastructural e-mail 
framework. This framework is intended to have the 
following characteristics, which we assume to be 
preconditions for an effectiveness in the long run and a 
widespread adoption by the e-mail community: 
? Both technological and organizational 
modifications must be minor.  
? An openness must be present, insofar as the 
framework provides for principles, and not for 
concrete algorithms or data formats. 
? Spam should be stopped as close to its true source 
as possible. The prevention of spam has a higher 
priority than does its detection. 
? Means to support the sending of solicited bulk e-
mails have to be provided. 
? The deployment of the key elements can be done 
smoothly and flexibly, i.e. the adoption of the 
infrastructure can occur evolutionarily. 
? The infrastructure must not undertake an “arms’ 
race” with spammers (for example, filters do 
undertake such a race). 
This rest of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section 2 provides an overview of the framework and 
of the interaction of its key components. The 
framework includes both organizational and 
technological elements, which are discussed in detail 
in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Deployment issues 
and the impact on e-mail communication are covered 
in Section 5. The paper closes with a consideration of 
the limitations and drawbacks in Section 6. 
 
2. Overview of the framework 
 
The core ideas of the framework are (1) to limit the 
number of e-mails that can be sent during a specific 
time-window and per account1, (2) to restrict the 
automatic set-up of e-mail accounts and (3) to provide 
means for controlling this limitation of e-mail traffic 
by introducing an element of centralism [2].2 In order 
                                                          
1 The implementation of rate limits on outbound e-mail traffic is part 
of  “Best practices for e-mail service providers”, which are proposed 
by many organizations,such as the Anti-Spam Technical Alliance [1]. 
2 In principle, the framework follows the idea that a credit of, for 
example, 100 messages per day is a very large number for an 
individual, but an inconsequential number for a spammer. 
to support these ideas, a new organizational role is 
introduced: the Counter Managing & Abuse Authority 
(CMAA). The framework is intended to include 
several organizations, each of them taking on the full 
CMAA role. These organizations are either new and 
designated ones or established ones, such as 
trustworthy e-mail service providers (ESPs). In our 
framework, in principle, a sending organization (SO), 
for example an ESP, either directly transmits an e-mail 
to the receiving organization (RO) or sends the e-mails 
to a CMAA organization, which then relays the 
message to the SO. The former option is today’s 
default option for sending e-mails, but is intended to be 
used in our framework only if the RO trusts the SO 
with regard to the implementation of effective anti-
spam measures. Otherwise, the latter option applies, 
which means that the CMAA first checks whether the 
sender would exceed the number of e-mails he or she 
is allowed to send on one day. Depending on the 
result, the CMAA would then either bounce the e-mail 
or relay it to the RO. This replacement of today’s 
direct SMTP connection between the SO and the RO 
by a relaying procedure represents an element of 
centralism, which allows for controlling and 
accounting the (volume of) e-mail traffic. This control 
is intended to strongly reduce the sending of 
unsolicited bulk e-mail. Solicited bulk e-mail may still 
be sent, if a person or organization accepts to be taken 
(legally) responsible for a proper use. The (anti-spam) 
control is also intended to make additional anti-spam 
measures by ROs obsolete. As the control mechanism 
is unlikely to prevent all spamming, it seems 
reasonable to complementarily provide a forum for e-
mail users’ complaints about unsolicited e-mails. 
Therefore, any CMAA organization is intended to also 
operate a central anti-spam abuse system. The abuse 
system and the relaying system are connected to each 
other in that numerous complaints about the spamming 
activities on behalf of a specific sender may lead to the 
blocking of the sender’s CMAA account and, thus, to 
the bouncing of further e-mails of this sender. For the 
rest of this paper, we use the shorter term CMAA for 
“CMAA organization”, unless we explicitly provide 
the term CMAA to designate the role. 
In order to implement the accountability, on which 
the framework bases, the SO sets up a record for each 
sender’s e-mail account prior to the first relaying. The 
records are stored in a “Counter Database (CDB)”. As 
any CMAA is also responsible for the locking of 
accounts due to abuse complaints, these complaints are 
stored in the “Abuse Database (ADB)”. A third 
database, the “Organization Database (ODB)”, serves 
for the storage of information about those SOs that are 
registered on the CMAA for the usage of its services. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the infrastructure framework. For the 
purpose of simplification, those infrastructure elements 
that are responsible for the administration of the 
databases are omitted. They are presented in Section 4. 
 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the infrastructure 
framework 
 
The introduction of additional organizational units 
that are responsible for the implementation of the 
described tasks requires organizational, technological, 
and financial support and, therefore, seems to be 
unnecessary and even counterproductive. However, 
some reasons support its appropriateness: 
1. The operation of CMAA (role) services is critical 
for the success of the framework and requires 
both the willingness and the technological ability 
to operate a CMAA properly. Organizations that 
reside in countries with a non-restrictive anti-
spam environment may only improperly fulfill 
these requirements; organizations that are 
notorious for addressing spam only 
lackadaisically are likewise unqualified. A 
CMAA that is operated and controlled by a 
trustworthy organization seems to be much more 
appropriate for providing the required services. 
2. The list of trustworthy organizations is CMAA-
specific and is maintained by each CMAA. The 
administration of decentralized whitelists and 
blacklists by ROs would become obsolete. Each 
organization receiving an e-mail that has been 
relayed (and counted) by a CMAA can assume 
that the SO is a trustworthy one. Therefore, ROs 
would only be required to maintain data for all 
CMAAs, such as IP lists of trustworthy MTAs. 
3. The infrastructure will not eradicate spam, but 
should support an abuse system. Currently 
decentralized abuse systems could be 
consolidated by integrating this service into the 
portfolio of the CMAAs. 
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Although the framework seems to resemble 
reputation-based approaches, such as LUMOS [3] or 
the sTDL approach of Spamhaus [4], it differs from 
them in two main issues: (1) The reputation-based 
approaches keep the e-mail communication direct. It is 
the RO that has to prove the reputation or accreditation 
of a particular SO. In contrast, our framework provides 
an additional organizational unit, which relays e-mails, 
and makes the communication indirect. Therefore, 
with our approach, it is not up to each RO to prove the 
reputation of a particular SO; this is a CMAA’s task. 
(2) With our approach, the SO’s fulfillment of 
requirements is not sufficient for the successful 
delivering of a message. In addition, a restriction on 
the remaining account-specific credit applies. 
However, as with reputation-based approaches, it 
remains an important task to formulate a set of 
requirements for SOs, which are effective regarding 
the misuse of a CMAA’s services and the fulfillment 
of which can be verified. Because of this importance, 
these issues are addresses in Section 3 in detail. 
 
3. Organizational facet 
 
The framework involves technological as well as 
organizational modifications to the Internet e-mail 
infrastructure and the e-mail processes. The 
organizational modifications, which are addressed in 
this section, result from the introduction of the CMAA 
as a new organizational role. As mentioned above, the 
framework is intended to involve several organizations 
each of them taking on the full CMAA role. However, 
a few outstanding key questions must be addressed 
prior to implementation and deployment: 1. Who will 
operate a CMAA? 2. How is a CMAA certified and by 
whom? 3. Which CMAA is responsible for which 
organization? 4. How does an organization register for 
the usage of CMAA services? These issues are 
addressed in the following subsections. 
 
3.1. Integrating CMAAs onto the Internet 
 
The introduction and the maintenance of a new 
organizational role that is as important and central as 
the CMAA demands a control and a policy that is 
independent of technological, economic, social, 
political, and cultural players. Therefore, we propose 
to entrust an established and well-accepted Internet 
organization, such as ISOC or ICANN, with the ruling 
of CMAA issues. In the following, we denote the 
trustworthy organization as central organization (CO). 
It is the task of the CO to specify precise 
requirements for a CMAA, receive submissions, 
inspect the applications, officially certificate applying 
organizations, and withdraw CMAA certificates. It is 
also desirable that the CO provides standardized 
software for CMAAs and their customer organizations.  
In principle, designated CMAA organizations may 
be set up. However, it seems reasonable to assume 
that, at least in the beginning, mainly already 
established network organizations, such as trustworthy 
ESPs, anti-spam organizations, and universities, will 
serve as CMAAs, because they already dispose of the 
technological experience, tools, and staff, all of which 
is helpful, if not crucial, to running a CMAA. The 
motivation to gain certification and serve as a CMAA 
can result from two goals: (1) If the CMAA services 
offered have to be paid for by the organizations that 
make use of them, then there may be an economic 
incentive. Furthermore, it saves the costs of registering 
for an external CMAA. (2) It may increase the 
organization’s reputation. 
The operation of a CMAA represents a new 
business segment of network operations, and in the 
long run, it seems unavoidable that organizations 
would have to pay for CMAA services. On the other 
hand, they may save money which they would have 
otherwise spent on anti-spam resources that are not 
needed anymore, such as filters. The fee for the usage 
of the CMAA services should be balanced: it should be 
high enough to attract potential operators, and it should 
be low enough to be non-cost-prohibiting for customer 
organizations. Especially organizations in less-
developed countries may be affected by this issue. 
 
3.2. Certificating an organization as CMAA 
 
The effectiveness of the framework regarding the 
reduction of spam e-mails heavily relies on the 
trustworthiness of the CMAA organizations. 
Therefore, the requirements on organizations that 
apply for certification as a CMAA should be stringent. 
We propose that the CO considers the following 
evaluation criteria for CMAA applicants: 
? An applying organization should have either a 
good reputation in the Internet community or at 
least references from such organizations. The 
reputation could include a high integrity in 
network-based services, an active involvement in 
anti-spam activities, and a good reputation with 
regard to anti-spam blacklists maintained by well-
accepted organizations. 
? The applicant should be under legislation that 
allows for prosecution in the case of any 
tolerating or supporting of spam activities. Any 
spam-promotive behavior, be it intentional or 
negligent, must be triable. Additionally, an 
applicant may be obliged to pay a deposit, that is 
forfeited in the case of a strong violation of the 
requirements on a CMAA. These requirements 
and any case of strong violation would have to be 
precisely specified in the contract signed by the 
CO and a particular CMAA. 
? The organization’s data in the “whois” database 
must have been successfully validated. 
? The implementation of technological 
requirements that are mandatory for the operation 
of a CMAA must be accomplished. These include 
(1) the protection of services and databases 
against security vulnerabilities, (2) a system 
redundancy in order to guarantee the operational 
availability of CMAA services in the case of 
system crashes and heavy traffic, and (3) an 
appropriate load balancing system for a time-
efficient use of the redundant systems in order to 
guarantee an appropriate throughput. We propose 
that the CO supports applicants with standardized 
and certified software for the operation of tasks 
that each CMAA has to perform. The usage of 
such software could even be regulated by the CO. 
The certification process is intended to involve 
personal contacts between the applying organization 
and the CO, and the agreement is formally defined by a 
contract.The list of certified organizations, their 
contact information, the CMAA policy that has to be 
signed by each certified organization, and 
organization-specific information, such as service fees, 
should be provided by the CO. Complaints about a 
violation against the CMAA policy should be directed 
to the CO, which can withdraw CMAA certificates if 
this is deemed necessary. 
 
3.3. Mapping organizations onto CMAAs 
 
It is the decision of each organization that sends e-
mails on behalf of its users whether it should use the 
services of one or more CMAAs, so that we have an 
(m : n) relationship between SOs and CMAAs. 
Usually, an SO would use only one CMAA. The 
framework is scalable in that it allows sending 
organizations to bypass any CMAA and to omit the 
registration on any CMAA. The pressure on these 
organizations to register is determined by the extent to 
which the Internet e-mail community accepts the 
importance of CMAAs, i.e. to which extent the 
community of ROs makes the decision of whether an 
e-mail is accepted or rejected dependent on the 
participation of a CMAA (or trustworthy SO). If the 
CMAAs’ role is widely adopted by the Internet e-mail 
community, an SO’s omission of a registration at a 
CMAA results in the rejection of messages sent to 
users of many or even most organizations.  
If an organization has decided to register for 
CMAA services, then the question arises as to which 
CMAA to choose. The mapping of organizations onto 
CMAAs can follow different paradigms. 
Market paradigm The decision could be left to the 
particular SO. Then, a market emerges with CMAAs 
as sellers and SOs as buyers. However, in order to 
support the wide diffusion and adoption of the 
CMAAs’ integration, the CO should regulate those 
issues that may otherwise hamper the diffusion of the 
usage of CMAAs. 
Regulation paradigm Mapping is regulated and 
CMAAs are assigned to SOs. Examples of regulatory 
approaches can be found at ICANN. 
The organizational structure of the framework is 
simple and illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Organizational structure of the 
infrastructure framework 
 
3.4. Registering for the usage of CMAA 
services 
 
One of the most critical requirements of the 
proposed infrastructure is the integrity of registered 
organizations. Although it seems impossible to exclude 
all those organizations that tolerate or even support 
spamming in advance, a set of requirements that 
applicants have to fulfill may be helpful for the 
reduction of fraudulent or careless organizations. 
Similar requirements can be found in [4].  
The organization’s data in the “whois” database 
must have been successfully validated. This includes 
that the administrative contact has signed the 
application form and proved the identity by attaching a 
copy of a valid identity card. In case of a repeated 
misuse of CMAA services, the toleration or even 
support of spammers this contact may be prosecuted. 
Each organization being registered has to sign the 
anti-spam policy to which it must adhere. In the case of 
a violation, the organization or its administrative 
contact can be prosecuted. 
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The administration client (see Fig. 3) has to be 
installed. Like the administration server, this software 
should be provided by the CO. 
A public key pair must be generated, and the public 
key must be added to the DNS. The private key has to 
be stored securely. 
For the purpose of authentication and authorization 
(when sending an e-mail to a CMAA), LMAP records 
have to be added to the DNS. 
The component that signs messages on behalf of the 
organization must be protected against any misuse. 
The CO should provide such software and specify the 
requirements on the hardware to be used. 
It has to be ensured that a reverse DNS query, with 
any name server of the applying organization as an 
argument, results in a FQDN whose “SLD.TLD” part 
is the name under which the organization is registered 
at its CMAA (see Equation (1)), where SLD is the 
second-level domain and TLD the top-level domain. 
One of the most important requirements on 
applying organizations is the demand for a manual set-
up of accounts. The automatic set-up must be 
prohibited because, otherwise, the limitation of the 
number of e-mails per account and day would be 
pointless. One option would be to initiate an offline 
registration procedure, which demands a letter-based 
application, that includes both user identification by 
signature and the provision of a valid mail address. 
Another option would be to implement a CAPTCHA 
procedure [5]. However, CAPTCHA procedures suffer 
from several drawbacks. We propose that the 
underlying algorithm has been evaluated by the CO 
and that the CO provides CAPTCHA software. 
In order to protect e-mail accounts from easy 
misuse, an authentication mechanism has to be applied. 
If SMTP-based connection is used, then SMTP-AUTH 
[9] can be used. Web-based e-mailing services are 
usually implemented with password-based protection. 
In contrast to the CMAA certification process, the 
registration process is not intended to involve a 
personal contact. The reason for this is that it would be 
too cumbersome, as the number of registering 
organizations is much higher than the number of 
CMAA applicants. 
 
4. Technological facet 
 
This section describes the technological 
specification of the framework. This specification 
consists of the description of the three central data 
stores, the CDB, the ADB, and the ODB, and of the 
processes that are related to database administration, to 
e-mail relaying and bouncing, and to the usage of the 
abuse system. Regarding the following process 
descriptions, it is not relevant whether the SO is 
identical with the CMAA or not. In the former case, 
the roles “SO” and “CMAA” are both realized by the 
same organization, and although some process 
simplifications may then be possible, in principle, the 
processes are even then intended to run as described.  
Further, it should be noted here that all of the 
technologies required to implement this proposal 
currently exist. The framework leverages existing 
technologies and services to reduce spam. The overall 
infrastructure framework is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
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Figure 3. Infrastructure framework 
 
4.1. Databases 
 
Most services offered by a CMAA need to access 
its CDB. For example, the decision of whether an e-
mail is relayed or bounced relies on the data of the 
particular CDB. We propose any CDB to maintain for 
every single CMAA-registered e-mail account the 
following data: account is the e-mail address of the 
database record. E-mails can be sent on its behalf. 
credit contains the current number of e-mails that can 
be sent on the current day. max is the number of e-
mails that can be sent per day on behalf of the 
particular account. bounce_status indicates whether a 
bounce e-mail has already been sent to the account. 
This would happen when the e-mail limit is first 
exceeded. Then, bounce_status would have to be 
changed to indicate that no further bounce e-mail is 
necessary. setup_org contains the SLD and the TLD of 
the organization that set up the record and which offers 
the e-mail account to the particular user. Only the 
organization that set up a record is authorized to relay 
e-mails on behalf of the e-mail address stored in that 
particular record. setup_date gives the date of the set-
up procedure and allows for statistical evaluations. 
holder provides the name and the mail address of the 
holder of the account. This information is mandatory, 
if the credit of the account exceeds the default credit, 
thus offering the option of sending solicited bulk e-
mail on behalf of that particular account. If this 
account is misused for the sending of unsolicited bulk 
e-mail, then the holder information may be used for 
prosecution. idle_days is the number of days the 
account has not been used. When certain thresholds are 
exceeded, the responsible organization – stored in 
setup_org – is informed about the possibly upcoming 
removal of the account and, finally, about its removal. 
blocks gives the number of times the account has been 
blocked so far. status allows the provision of 
information about the status of the account. Possible 
values are “open” and “blocked”. The status “blocked” 
may be reached, when a specific number of complaints 
have been received. 
Regarding the misuse of the abuse system, we 
propose that each complainant can only submit one 
abuse complaint per day and account. The ADB would 
contain the following data: account is the e-mail 
address being complained about. setup_org contains 
the same type of information as the corresponding 
entry in the CDB. This redundancy serves the purpose 
of efficiency, when organization-related abuse 
information is being composed. sender provides the e-
mail address of the complainant. This information is 
necessary to ensure compliance with the restriction 
mentioned above. date gives the date of the abuse 
complaint. 
The ODB contains information about the 
organizations that have successfully registered for the 
usage of the CMAA services. We propose storing the 
following information: organization contains the same 
type of information as the corresponding entry in the 
CDB. registration_date gives the date of the 
registration process. complaints1,…, complaints30 
provide the number of abuse complaints for the last 30 
days, whereby 30 is an arbitrary number.  
admonishments1,…, admonishments6 allows the 
storage of the number of admonishments for the last 
six months. Again, six is an arbitrary number. status 
provides information about whether the organization 
has been excluded or whether it may still use the 
CMAA services. 
It should be noted that the protection of e-mail 
addresses that are stored in the databases is very 
important, because the databases would otherwise 
provide valuable resources for spammers. Although 
the usage of hash values or encrypted addresses would 
seem to be solutions to this problem, they suffer from 
these drawbacks: If only hash values of addresses are 
stored, then the addresses cannot be recovered 
efficiently. However, the addresses are needed for 
some CMAA administration messages. If the addresses 
are stored encryptedly, they can be recovered by 
applying the decrypt function. However, most CDB 
administration processes and the e-mail delivery 
process include the sending of an e-mail address that 
would have to be encrypted or decrypted. Because of 
the high number of expected queries, the use of 
cryptographic functions would probably consume too 
much time. Therefore, the usage of other mechanisms, 
such as authorization-based ones, should be explored. 
This discussion reflects the challenge to many 
infrastructures and systems in finding an appropriate 
balance between security, functionality, and (time-
related) efficiency. 
 
4.2. Database administration processes 
 
Access to the CDB is granted to SOs that have been 
approved for the usage of the CMAA-specific CDB 
and to the CMAA itself. SOs are allowed to set up, 
modify, and remove records, herein denoted as 
processes P1, P2, and P3. The CMAA is responsible 
for the periodical maintenance of the CDB records in 
many regards. It has to reset values of each record, for 
example, the credit, by a fixed time of the day (P4), to 
trace accounts that have not been used for a specific 
time in order to remove those particular accounts or to 
inform the responsible SO about the possible 
upcoming removal (P5), and to block accounts due to 
spam complaints (P6). 
The administration of the ADB and of the ODB is 
reserved for the CMAA. It is responsible for both the 
detection of accounts, for which many abuse 
complaints have arrived, and the detection of SOs that 
are responsible for such “suspicious” accounts. As a 
consequence, accounts have to be blocked and SOs 
have to be admonished or even excluded from all 
CMAA services (P7). All complaint and 
admonishment information stored in the ODB has to 
be updated periodically, because complaints only refer 
to the last 30 days and admonishments only to the last 
six months (P8). 
As the data that are exchanged between an SO and 
an CMAA are structured, the usage of e-mails seems to 
be improper. Rather, the Simple Object Access 
Protocol (SOAP) [6] provides means for this 
communication. Any CMAA message is intended to be 
cryptographically signed by using the “SOAP Security 
Extensions”.  
Process P1: setting up a CMAA record P1 is 
illustrated in Fig. 4, which models the process with a 
UML 2.0 activity diagram. The process is initiated by a 
user when he/she wants to set up an e-mail account at 
an SO. The user usually applies online by using a web 
form and is intended to have two options regarding 
credit: if the user needs more than the default credit, 
then he or she has to authenticate. This authentication 
is intended to be submitted offline by mail or fax and 
must disclose the user’s identity and address. For a 
possible prosecution due to spamming, we propose 
ensuring that the user underlies an opt-in legislation. If 
the user applies for an account with default credit, then 
either the same authentication procedure applies or an 
effective CAPTCHA  procedure  has to  validate that a 
human user is applying. If the authentication/validation 
succeeds, then the SO applies for a CDB record at its 
CMAA. The CMAA first checks the authenticity. We 
propose applying a (cryptographic) signature-based 
procedure for this, because this approach makes it 
rather difficult, if not practically impossible, to spoof 
sender data , which  would  easily lead to the setting up 
of an arbitrary number of accounts. The SOs’ public 
keys could be stored in the DNS. If the authentication 
fails for any reason, a rejection message is sent to the 
SO. Otherwise, the CMAA has to proceed with the 
authorization of the SO to set up a record for the 
particular e-mail account. The SO is granted this 
permission if it is responsible for the e-mail account. 
This responsibility is defined as follows: either the 
SLD.TLD domain of the e-mail address is a domain of 
the SO, for example schryen@winfor.rwth-aachen.de, 
where rwth-aachen.de is a domain of RWTH Aachen 
University, or the domain is hosted by the SO, for 
example, the domain of the e-mail address 
guido@schryen.de, schryen.de is hosted by the SO. In 
both cases, each authoritative name server for the 
given domain belongs to the SO. This verification can 
be undertaken by using the DNS: let DNSNS(domain) 
be the operation that requests the DNS for a name 
server of domain, let RDNS(IP) be the operation that 
requests the DNS for the host that matches IP, let 
SLDTLD(address) be the operation that returns the 
SLD.TLD  part  of  a  host  or   an   e-mail  address,  let 
setup_org be the SLD.TLD part of the organization 
that requests the record set-up, and let address be the e-
mail address for which a record is requested. Then, the 
requirement can be verified by using two, possibly 
cascading, accesses to the DNS: 
SLDTLD(RDNS(DNSNS(SLDTLD(address))))  
     = setup_org3     (1) 
If the verification of responsibility succeeds, the 
CMAA sets up the record and sends a confirmation to 
the SO, which then sets up the particular e-mail 
account and sends a confirmation message  to   the   
user.   If  the  verification  fails,  the  CMAA   sends   a  
                                                          
3 Note that for a successful authorization, each requesting 
organization is responsible for the provision of adequate DNS 
entries. 
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Figure 4. Activity diagram modeling the set-up 
of a CDB record 
 
rejection to the SO, which then sends a rejection 
message to the user. The CMAA SOAP server 
application has to consider that holder data must be 
provided if the value of max is higher than the default 
value, which still has to be defined. 
Process P2: modifying a CMAA record SO is 
allowed to modify the max value and/or the holder 
value only. If the max value is reset to the default 
value, no holder data must be given. Otherwise the 
provision of holder data is mandatory. When an SO 
sends a modification request to the CMAA, the CMAA 
proceeds analog to its operations in P1.  
Process P3: removing a CMAA record The 
deletion of a CMAA record only requires that the SO 
provide the account name. Regarding the SO’s SOAP 
message, the notes on P2 apply. 
Processes P4 and P5: resetting the credits of 
CMAA records and tracing for idle CMAA 
accounts By a fixed time of the day, the CMAA would 
have to reset the values of each record. The tracing idle 
CMAA accounts can be shared with this procedure. 
Process P6 and P7: blocking CMAA accounts 
or/and SOs The CMAA should daily consolidate 
abuse complaints. This consolidation may lead to the 
blocking or removal of user accounts. Furthermore, if 
too many complaints refer to different accounts of one 
specific SO, then the SO has to be admonished or even 
excluded from all CMAA services. 
When the number of abuse complaints on a specific 
account exceeds the daily limit, the account is blocked 
for one day. Each account may be blocked a number of 
times, which are still to be specified. If the total 
number of blocking exceeds this value, then the 
account is removed and the responsible SO is informed 
about this deletion. 
It may happen that SOs ignore, tolerate or even 
support the abuse of e-mail accounts. Therefore, for 
each organization, all complaints about those accounts 
that the organization is responsible for are counted and 
stored in the ODB, which contains for each SO the 
number of abuse complaints for each of the last six 
months. We differentiate between three abuse states 
that an organization can be assigned: normal, medium, 
and strong. The status results from the application of 
the CMAA’s policy on the SO’s six-month complaint 
history and the SO’s number of past admonishments. 
The following actions have to be taken by the CMAA, 
depending on the SO’s status: If the history is assessed 
as “normal”, nothing has to be done. If the value is 
“medium", then the CMAA sends an admonishment to 
the SO and records this. In the case of a “strong” 
violation, that particular SO would have to be excluded 
from all CMAA services. The status would be set to 
“excluded”, all accounts that had been set up by the 
SO would be removed, and the SO and all other 
CMAAs would be informed about this exclusion. 
Process P8: removing complaint and 
admonishment information Complaints older than 30 
days and admonishments older than 6 months are 
intended to be removed from the ODB. The removal of 
complaints has to be executed once a day, the deletion 
of admonishment information once a month. 
 
4.3. E-mail delivery process 
 
The process of sending an e-mail has to be extended 
by the integration of a CMAA. Although a CMAA’s 
involvement makes the delivery process more 
complicated, the modifications are intended to be 
hidden from the user, who may continue using his/her 
e-mail client software without any changes. Fig. 5 
shows the process by using an activity diagram. The 
process can be divided into the following components: 
User authentication: First, the user has to 
authenticate, so that his/her account is protected from 
misuse by an unauthorized person. We  propose  using  
the  IETF   standard   SMTP-AUTH [7]  with  a   (user, 
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Figure 5. Activity diagram modeling the 
e-mailing process 
 
password) SASL authentication mechanism [8]. 
However, for effective protection from misuse, the 
password must be strong and protected from being 
read by malicious software. If the authentication fails, 
the process is terminated, otherwise the user can send 
the e-mail to his/her SO. 
SO’s relaying decision: For each recipient of the e-
mail, the SO looks for the RO in the internal database 
that stores the names of  those  organizations  that  
accept  direct e-mail communication with the own 
organization. If the RO is listed, the e-mail is sent 
directly to the RO, otherwise it is sent to the SO’s 
CMAA. The case where the SO is identical to the RO 
is covered implicitly. In such a case, the involvement 
of a CMAA is not intended. However, it should still be 
an option for an SO to let a CMAA count those e-mails 
that are not directed to another SO, in order to protect 
their  users’ accounts from being spammed. For the 
sake of simplicity, this option is omitted in Fig. 5. 
CMAA’s relaying decision: The CMAA checks 
whether the SO is registered and not excluded –  the 
SO data can be obtained from the e-mail’s FQDN, 
which has to be successfully validated against the IP of 
the sending host by using an LMAP-based procedure –
, if the CMAA maintains a record for the sender and if 
the SO is allowed to send e-mails on behalf of the 
sender account. If one of these conditions is not 
fulfilled, the CMAA refuses the relaying and sends a 
bounce e-mail to the SO, which, then sends a bounce 
e-mail to the sender. If all tests succeed, the CMAA 
checks the sender’s credit. If no credit is available, the 
relaying is refused and, provided that no bounce e-mail 
due to the unavailable credit has been sent, a bounce e-
mail is sent to the SO. It is important to send, at most, 
one bounce e-mail per day and account due to credit 
unavailability, because it would be otherwise possible 
to maliciously initiate the sending of an arbitrary 
number of bounce e-mails to a compromised account: 
once a password is read or guessed, an attacker could 
easily send e-mails on behalf of this account thereby 
causing the CMAA to send a bounce e-mail for each e-
mail that exceeds the account’s e-mail limit. If the 
credit is larger than 0, then the credit is decreased by 1 
and the e-mail is relayed to the SO. 
RO’s acceptance decision: When an organization 
receives an e-mail, it first operates an LMAP-based 
validation as described above. If the validation fails, 
the process terminates. Otherwise, the RO checks 
whether the SO is whitelisted regarding a direct e- mail 
communication or if the delivering host belongs to a 
CMAA. If this check is successful, the e-mail is 
accepted and delivered to the e-mail’s recipient. 
Otherwise, the e-mail acceptance is refused and a 
bounce e-mail is sent to the SO. 
If a CMAA participates in e-mail delivery, its 
MTA(s) add Received entries to the header as 
described in [9]. No further modification is necessary. 
 
4.4. Abuse complaint process 
 
The success of the abuse system depends on the 
user participation in the sending of abuse e-mails to the 
CMAAs. In order to make a user send a spam 
complaint to a CMAA, he/she has to know to which 
CMAA the complaint has to be directed. We envisage 
at least two options for providing this information: 
either the CMAA that relays a message adds a new 
header entry to the e-mail or it adds this information to 
the e-mail’s body as part of a CMAA signature. The 
first option would be preferable for keeping an e-mail 
text free from any CMAA (meta) information and for 
easing the implementation. The reason is that the 
header entry could be added at the beginning of the 
message without seeking the appropriate position in 
the body, which could contain several MIME parts 
thereby complicating the e-mail’s structure. The 
second option allows the recipient to easily identify the 
abuse address without having to make the header 
entries visible. In addition, many users are likely to 
know little or nothing about the header. 
When a user wants to complain about a received e-
mail, then the user would have to send an abuse e-mail 
to the responsible CMAA via his or her organization. 
The CMAA that receives the complaint e-mail would 
have to perform three checks: (1) Is the SO registered 
and not been excluded? (2) Does the CMAA maintain 
a record for the account being complained about? (3) 
Does the ADB already contain a complaint tuple 
(account,sender,date)? The purpose of the third check 
is to prevent the abuse system from being misused by 
users sending multiple complaints about the same 
account in order to discredit it. Only if all checks are 
positive, is a new complaint record added to the ADB. 
The setup org data can be obtained by requesting the 
CDB. As this process is very simple, a graphical 
representation is omitted here. 
The content and format of a complaint e-mail is not 
specified here, in order to avoid an 
overstandardization; however, an abuse e-mail must 
contain the account and the date of the e-mail being 
complained about. The content and format may vary 
between different CMAAs, although for the purpose of 
consistency, it is useful to standardize these issues. 
 
5. Deployment and impact on e-mail 
communication 
 
A precondition for any deployment of the proposed 
framework seems to be its adoption by the ISOC, 
ICANN, and/or large ESPs. This adoption includes 
both the maintenance of a CO and the propagation of 
the framework in the Internet e-mail community. 
The framework is designed to use both a direct 
e-mail communication and an indirect one by 
integrating CMAAs. This flexibility means a 
scalability of the framework that allows the avoidance 
of a “big bang” at its introduction, but leaves the (time) 
schedule for using using CMAAs and its grade up to 
each organization. An ESP, for example, can decide 
not to use CMAAs at all, to use CMAAs for incoming 
e-mails, to register for a CMAA’s services, or even to 
apply for a CMAA certificate. Although no 
organization is forced to participate in the centralized 
services, market pressure – assuming that the infra-
structure has been widely adopted – will push them to 
do so, as they are otherwise in danger of being 
excluded from large parts of the world-wide e-mail 
communication. This consequence would make the 
ESP unattractive or even unacceptable from the users’ 
view. 
 
Figure 6. Partitioning of the Internet e-mail 
communication 
If we categorize communication scenarios 
according to the SO and RO types, we get those 
categories illustrated in Fig. 6. Organizations that are 
certified  or  registered are not  limited  in  their  e-mail 
communication. Other organizations would not be 
allowed to send e-mails to registered certified 
organizations, which would usually insist on the 
registration or certification of the SO. This means that 
the overall e-mail communication becomes limited. 
The area of limitation is indicated by the “X”. The 
grade of limitation will depend on the extent to which 
the CMAAs will be accepted and used. If the proposed 
infrastructure is either widely accepted or hardly 
accepted, then the limitation is low, because most e-
mail communication belongs to one of the categories, 
which are displayed as ellipses. A high limitation, i.e. 
“X” indicates a large subset of e-mail communication, 
would result from a balanced distribution. 
 
6. Drawbacks and limitations 
 
The implementation of the framework requires both 
organizational and technological modifications of 
today’s Internet e-mail infrastructure. These 
modifications have to be propagated by Internet 
organizations and providers in order to become widely 
accepted. However, even then, the framework has 
some drawbacks and limitations. 
First, some option for spamming still remain, even 
if they consume more resources than today. For 
example, e-mail accounts can be set up manually at 
registered organizations and then used for spamming, 
accounts of legitimate users can be compromised by 
malicious software, organizations that have 
successfully registered for CMAA services may be 
corrupt or may tolerate spammers, and an SO that is 
stored on an RO’s whitelist can bypass any CMAA 
and send an unlimited number of (spam) e-mails.  
Second, the approach requires a critical mass of 
organizations to drive the framework’s adoption.  
Third, the DNS becomes an even more critical and 
important resource than it is today for the following 
reasons: (1) The DNS has to provide entries for public 
keys of registering organizations. Ideally, the public 
keys are signed by a trustful organization. (2) LMAP 
records of SOs and CMAAs have to be added to the 
DNS. Currently, no single approach has been adopted 
as a world-wide standard. (3) DNS spoofing would 
have an impact on the sending of spam e-mails: a 
CMAA’s decision to relay an e-mail depends on the 
LMAP record. If this entry is spoofed, then a third 
party could send e-mails on behalf of another 
registered organization. (4) The availability of DNS 
servers is closely related to the availability and 
functionality of the Internet e-mail infrastructure. This 
attracts attacks on the availability of these servers, such 
as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. 
Fourth, the CMAAs’ systems represent a critical 
resource: (1) The availability of the relays and 
administration servers is critical with regard to the 
operational maintenance of large parts of Internet e-
mail traffic. Therefore, the consequences of a 
successful DDoS attack are tremendous. (2) The 
servers have to handle a huge amount of traffic and 
requests. This requires a careful implementation of 
load balancing systems, if e-mail communication is not 
to become (timely) inefficient. (3) The CMAAs’ CDBs 
contain large numbers of valid e-mail addresses and 
have to be protected from unauthorized access. 
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